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This paper analyzes the welfare implications of a transfer mechanism in a fiscally decentralized 
economy where local governments select their tax collection effort to maximize their lifetime 
utility. We consider a transfer rule that both punishes for the lack of efficiency in tax-collection 
and compensates for the deviation of pre-tax or transfer income from a target level; in addition, 
a portion of transfers is considered to be directed towards investment.  
Simulations of the model’s optimal solution reveal that increasing punishment always 
results  in  increased  steady  state  effort,  despite  the  disincentives  that  increasing  income 
compensation  or  directed  investment  may  generate.  Increasing  punishment  also  improves 
capital  accumulation  the  lower  the  rate  of  directed  investments  and  the  lower  the  tax rate. 
Further, efficiency in tax collection is achieved the lower the rate of directed investment and the 
higher the punishment rate.  
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1   Introduction 
 
Fiscal decentralization (FD), defined as the devolution of fiscal power and responsibilities from 
central towards local governments, has potential advantages and disadvantages that have been 
discussed widely in the literature following the seminal work of Oates (1972). If FD improves 
fiscal efficiency, one conjectures that it contributes to social welfare. The literature suggests that 
the  effectiveness  of  FD  is  related  with  various  institutional  and  structural  factors  that  vary 
across countries (see, for example, Tanzi, 2000, de Mello, 2000, and Neyapti, 2010). Accordingly, 
among the growing number of studies that investigate the effects of FD, empirical studies that 
focus on the growth implications of FD also show mixed evidence (see, for example, Davoodi and 
Zou,  1998,  Lin  and  Liu,  2000,  Martinez-Vazquez  and  McNab,  2006,  Thiessen,  2003).  More 
recently,  a  number  of  studies  focuses  on  the  welfare  implications  of  FD  and  reveals  the 
importance  of  the  design  of  a  redistribution  mechanism  that  is  crucial  for  the  effective 
implementation of FD (see, for example, Sanguinetti and Tomassi, 2004, Stowhase and Traxler, 
2005 and Akin et al., 2010).  
In  view  of  the  large  vertical  imbalances  that  exist  in  less  developed  and  developed 
countries alike3, the design of a redistributive rule appears crucial in setting the incentives for 
local governments. In a recent study, Akin et al. (2010) investigate the effectiveness of FD under 
a transfer mechanism that both punishes the inefficiency in tax collection and compensates for 
the deviation from target income levels.4 The authors show that, under such a redistributive rule, 
while FD increases efficiency in tax collection, the objective of improving equity across localities 
is only attained in case of an explicit convergence target.   
The  current  paper  investigates  the  role  of  redistributive  mechanism  in  generating 
incentives  for  local  government  efficiency  in  a  dynamic  framework.  We  propose  a  dynamic 
model of local government decision-making in view of the redistributive rule a la Akin et al. 
(2010) and, in addition, assume that part of the transfers is centrally decided to be directed 
towards  local  capital  accumulation.  Facing  this  type  of  a  fiscal  rule,  a  representative  local 
government chooses its tax-collection effort to maximize its lifetime utility. In order to have 
                                                                                                                                                
3  Although  developing  countries  have  greater  vertical  imbalances,  on  average,  than 
developed countries, even in developed countries that are federal states, such as Canada, 
Switzerland, US and Germany, central government transfers constitute 50% to 70% of local 
budgets.  
4 4   Ma (1997) points out that among the transfer systems observed in practice, those that take 
into account both revenue capacities and expenditure needs are the most developed, 
although also the most demanding, ones.       3 3 
some redistribution to take place across localities, simulations are performed such that local 
incomes are differentiated by their income shares of capital. To close the model, it is further 
considered that general government budget constraint holds. 
    Battaglini et al. (2010) propose a dynamic behavioral model to investigate the extent of 
free  riding  problem  arising  from  short-sightedness,  where  the  central  versus  decentralized 
decision making are analyzed with regards to the investment and consumption choices. The 
authors  conclude  that  the  mechanism  characterized  by  the  central  government  decision  on 
investment and redistribution is superior to the decentralized decision in terms of higher steady 
state  level  of  investment  and  the  public  good.  The  results  are  supported  by  experimental 
analysis and shed light on the dynamic aspects of public good provision. The current paper is in 
lines with Battaglini et al.’s findings with regard to the centralization of the decision to allocate a 
portion of public resources towards investment.  
The model is solved for the steady state. The simulation analysis reveals that while the 
steady state income, capital or welfare decreases in the tax rate and the income compensation 
component of the transfer rule, it increases in the rate of directed investments. The welfare 
improving effect of the punishment rate, however, is observed to decrease in the investment 
rate. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 discusses the 
comparative statistics and reports the results of the simulation analysis. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2  The Model 
 
A representative local government maximizes its lifetime utility: 
 





t i, t i,       G ln        C ln    β α                       (1) 
where i =1…n stands for ith local government. α and β represent the relative weights of private 
(Ci) and government spending (Gi) in utility. Ci  and Gi are given by: 
 
Ci,t =(1- ti)yi,t             (2)
     
Gi,t = (1- c) ti yi,t + γTRi,t           (3) 
           4 4 
where yi stands for (per capita) income in the ith locality.   t is the tax rate and c is the ratio of local 
tax revenue remitted to the central government for the purposes of transfers; both of which are 
assumed to be fixed across localities. ti=t.Ai is the effective tax rate for local government i, where 
Ai is the tax collection effort ( 1 0 ≤ ≤ it A ); Ai taking the value of 1 means that full effort is spent 
in tax collection. γTR shows that γ portion of transfers are used as part of the current expenses of 
local governments, while the remaining transfers [(1-γ)TR] are invested locally. This type of 
transfers,  where  the  end  use  is  determined  when  transfers  are  disbursed,  is  referred  to  as 
directed- or closed-ended budget transfers.  
The  constraint  of  a  representative  local  government  is  that  it  receives  transfers 
according  to  the  redistributive  rule  that  both  punishes  inefficiency  in  tax  collection  and 
compensates for the deviation from target income levels (Equation 4).  
 
TRi,t = p t yi,t(Ai,t -1) + m (yi,t*- yi,t)                                        (4) 
 
where yi* stands for the target income level in the ith locality.   The rate of punishment for the 
inefficiency in tax collection is indicated by p, wheras the rate of compensation of the deviation 
of income from its target is m.   Hence, we explore the implications of a transfer rule that is given 
by equation (4) that is accompanied by the closed-ended nature of transfers. 
A Cobb-Douglass type of production function (Equation 5) is assumed, where the income 
share of capital is given by 0<θ<1. The capital stock follows the usual accumulation rule, shown 




t i k ,               (5) 
 
ki,t = (1-δ) ki,t-1 +(1-γ)TRi,t  ,          (6) 
 
where δ is the rate of depreciation (0<δ<1). k is the per capita level of capital.  
A representative local government maximizes (1) subject to (4). After substituting for Ci 
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1 ≤ it A    ;          0 ≥ t λ  ;       0 ) 1 ( = − it t A λ          (8) 
 
where λt is the value of Lagrange multiplier at time t. One can easily observe that the second 
order conditions are also satisfied (see Appendix 1.b). Based on the complementary slackness 
condition, there are two cases arising, the first one being Ait<1 (and λt =0) and the other is the full 
effort case. We consider the first case to be the interesting one from an intuitive point of view 
(the latter case is also summarized in the Appendix 1). In that case, (7) becomes: (Cit/Git) =(α/β). 
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it y is the income target that we assume, without loss of generality, to be 10% higher than 
the past period’s income level:
θ
1
* ) 1 . 1 ( − = it it k y . Substituting this expression in (2) we find the 
optimum TR: 
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Substituting this expression in (6) yields the evolution of capital under optimality. 
 
We define the steady-state as the per capita level of capital (and income) k* (and y*) that 
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Using this expression, the steady state levels of transfers, income and utility are also found (see 
Appendix 1).  
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3  Simulation Analysis 
 
In this section we examine the effects of policy parameters p, m and γ on the steady state levels 
of capital, income, consumption, transfers, utility and government spending. The findings are 
conjectured  to  shed  light  on  the  optimal  design  of  a  redistribution  policy  under  fiscal 
decentralization. Since the comparative static analysis does not yield closed-form solutions for 
the partial derivatives with respect to these parameters, simulation analysis is necessary. We 
assign the following values to the underlying parameters of the model: 
 
Table 1: Parameter values 
__________________________________________________________________________   
δ  0.1       Depreciation rate 
α   0.7    Utility share of private consumption    
β    0.3       Utility share of public consumption 
t  0.4  Tax rate 




The utility shares α and β are chosen to represent the relative sizes of private and public 
sectors.  In  addition,  the  tax  rate  accords  with  the  average  tax  revenue  to  GDP  ratio  in  the 
advanced economies. 6  
For redistribution to take place in the economy described above, some heterogeneity 
needs to be introduced for the differential treatment of the local governments. This can be done 
via  different  capital  shares  of  income:  θi.  For  simplicity,  the  current  analysis  assumes  two 
localities, for which we consider that θ1=0.1 and θ2 =0.3, assuming that the second region is 
richer in capital than the first.7 Equation 9 indicates, however, that the steady-state effort is the 
same across localities, as it is unaffected by the level of capital or income. In view of the different 
local incomes, transfers are determined according to the following general government budget 
constraint:   
                                                                                                                                                
5 5   The figure is selected based on the information on Turkish budget practices; since this data 
is not easily available for other countries to get a representative figure, a range of other 
values are also used in the simulations.    
6 The information is based on the 2009 data; source: Government Financial Statistics, the IMF, 
2011. The average tax rate for US is about 30%, for Norway it is 56%, whereas it is usually 
lower for developing countries. 
7 7   Mankiw et al. (1992) show that θ=1/3 for the case of the US.       7 7 
 
TRt  = (TR1,t+TR2,t )  ≤  ct(A( y1,t+ y2,t))        (12) 
 
Equation (12) indicates that total transfers cannot exceed total tax submissions to the central 
government, allowing for positive or negative transfer flows to an individual locality. 
 
4  Implications 
 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the comparative static analysis that are based on the 
simulations of the optimal steady state values of k and A. The response of the steady-state levels 
of capital and effort to the main fiscal policy parameters: p, m, γ and t can be summarized as 
follows. First, the negative relationship between m and both k and A points at the well-expected 
moral hazard result: the higher the rate of compensation for income deviation from a target, the 
lower is the local tax collection effort. Second, increasing the tax rate reduces the tax effort, as 
well as capital, which is consistent with the Laffer-curve relationship. 
 
Table 2:    Comparative Statics Results       
  m  p  t  γ 
k  -  ?  -  ? 
A  -  +  -  + 
       (? indicates ambiguity of sign, to be explained below) 
 
Table 2 also indicates that efficiency in tax collection (A) increases in the punishment rate, as 
was reported for the static case in Akin et al. (2010) as well, while it decreases in the investment 
rate (or, increases in γ). The first of these effects is straightforward. The latter effect can be 
interpreted  as  the  wealth  effect:  the  lower  the  rate  of  transfers  that  are  directed  towards 
investment (the higher the γ), the lower are capital and income, that increases the incentive for 
tax collection. In other words, tax collection effort decreases in wealth that is caused by higher 
directed investment rate.   
 
Proposition 1:   Increasing the punishment for the lack of tax collection effort (p) leads to 
increased  effort  (∂A/∂p>0),  notwithstanding  the  disincentives  that  arise  from  income 
compensation or high investment rates.      8 8 
 
Simulations reveal that the effects of p and γ on the steady state level of capital depend on 
the rest of the model parameters. In particular, it s observed that the tax rate is a key parameter 
for the positive effect of punishment on capital accumulation. For tax rates above 0.40, greater 
punishment for the lack of effort (p) is associated with lower steady-state capital (see Appendix 
2, Figure 3).  The positive effect of increasing p on k also seems to increase in p the higher is c 
and the lower is m. Increasing the income compensation rate (m) leads to a higher threshold for 
p for which the positive relationship between p and k is observed, indicating that increasing m 
hinders the positive incentives p generates on optimal effort (that is, ∂2k/∂p∂m <0). In addition, 
the higher is c, the lower the range of t for which ∂k/∂p>0, suggesting that c and t can be treated 
as substitute policy parameters. 
Simulations also reveal that steady-state capital decreases in γ as well. Indeed, the positive 
impact of p on k is only observed for high levels of p and γ (in case p>0.5 and γ >0.5 for t=0.4; for 
all p and γ for t ≤ 0.3). This suggests that punishment is incentive-compatible only if the rate of 
directed transfers is low; hence, the higher the γ, the more it pays to punish. This is because of 
the  negative  association  of  the  rate  of  directed  investment  and  the  optimum  effort.  This 
observation suggests that a social planner could employ a transfer rule such as the one indicated 
here, especially where that a transfer system where directed investments is not prevalent, ın 
order to effectively impose punishment on the lack of tax collection. 
 
Proposition 2:  Increasing the punishment rate improves the steady state welfare. capital and 
growth) the lower the rates of taxes and directed investments (∂2k/∂p∂t<0 and  ∂2k/∂p∂ γ >0). 
 
Additional simulation results reported in Appendix 3 reveal the following. First, horizontal  
imbalances  are  narrowed  (measured  by  comparing  the  income  ratios  before  and  after-
redistribution) as p increases, the lower are the rates of m, (1-γ), and t. The same conditions hold 
for the welfare effects of increasing p. As consistent with the observations on A and k, welfare 
also decreases in t; for low t, it decreases in γ and increases in p (for higher t, it is non monotonic 
in both γ and p). Also in accordance with the results for capital, welfare increases in p only when 
γ is high and t is low. In case the investment rate (and t) is high, government surpluses (that may 
be interpreted as deadweight loses in the current model) increase with punishment.  Deficits 
increase (deadweight losses decrease) when t is low and γ and p are high (reaching to about 7 
percent of GDP in case t=0.3; m=0.5; p=0.8 and γ=0.8, see Appendix 3). 
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5   Conclusion 
 
This paper presents an original model to explore the efficiency of fiscal decentralization in a 
dynamic  framework,  where  local  governments  face  a  redistributive  rule,  announced  by  the 
central government, that punishes lack of effiency in tax copllection and compansates for the 
deviation  from  a  target  income.  The  redistributive  rule  is  coupled  by  a  policy  of  directed 
transfers that alocate an exogenously specifed (by the central government) portion of transfers 
to capital accumulation.  
Besides the finding that the steady state capital stock increases in the portion of directed 
investment spending, that is consistent with expectations, simulations indicate that it increases 
in the punishment rate, while decreasing in the compansation rate and the tax rate.  The analysis 
provided in the paper suggests that the incentives generated for tax collection effort through the 
proposed redistributive rule improves welfare – provided that it is combined with the policy of 
directed transfers. The policy proposal that emerges in the paper is that a transfer mechanism 
such as the one proposed here leads to important welfare gains especially in economies where a 
system of investment-ended transfers does not prevail. 
     1 10 0 
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Appendix 1 
 
1.a    First order analysis: 
 
The constraint qualification is obviously satisfied since the constraints are  
linear. Also note that objective function is concave. So we can apply the Kuhn Tucker’s theorem. 
The Lagrangean expression is obtained after substituting Equation 4 into 3 and substituting 
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  Maximizing this expression yields the following first order conditions: 
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Assuming the target income to be 10% higher than the past period’s income level:
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From Equation 4: 
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From Equation (6), one finds today’s capital in terms of previous capital: 
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The steady-state implies that, at each period in time, tax effort, capital and the  
other time-dependent variables are equal with each other: 
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The steady state utility is  
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In the full effort case, steady state capital depends only on  θ δ γ , , , m . .   However,  
this case can not hold each period since the local government has an incentive to reduce his tax 
effort while getting the same utility. 
 
1.b    Second order analysis: 
 
Because the constraint qualification and first order condition are satisfied, then 
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where f is the objective function and j is the number of constraints. 
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Since the model’s inequality constraint is linear, its second order derivative is zero, that 
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As a result, the second order condition is satisfied without any condition.     1 15 5 
Appendix 2   Critical policy parameters 
 
1.   Punishment rate:  
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Appendix 3:     Simulations of the Model’s Aggregates  ( t=0.4; θ1=0.1; θ2=0.3, c=0.1) 
(U: utility; Y: income; C: consumption; G: government spending; A: local tax collection effort; DWL/Y: deadweight loss in percentage of income; TR: 
transfers; k: capital stock). 
 t=0.4; theta1=0.1; theta2=0.3, c=0.1  t=0.3; theta1=0.1; theta2=0.3, c=0.1
m 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
p 0.2 0.5 0.8 Impact of 0.3 increase in p 0.2 0.5 0.8 Impact of 0.3 increase in p 0.2 0.5 0.8 Impact of 0.3 increase in p
Gamma=0.8
Capital 0.070 0.068 0.111 -0.03 0.64 0.048 0.048 0.091 0.01 0.89 0.118 0.177 0.285 0.51 0.61
A 0.790 0.912 0.995 0.15 0.09 0.803 0.922 1.005 0.15 0.09 1.018 1.144 1.230 0.12 0.08
U -2.453 -2.488 -2.317 -0.01 0.07 -2.605 -2.623 -2.398 -0.01 0.09 -2.237 -2.078 -1.888 0.07 0.09
Deficit 0.002 -0.004 0.010 -3.61 3.29 -0.008 -0.012 0.001 -0.58 1.11 0.024 0.046 0.093 0.95 1.00
DWL/Y -0.002 0.004 -0.009 3.62 -3.10 0.008 0.012 -0.001 0.58 -1.10 -0.021 -0.037 -0.068 -0.81 -0.84
Y 1.052 1.047 1.140 -0.01 0.09 0.988 0.990 1.102 0.00 0.11 1.152 1.240 1.354 0.08 0.09
Y1 0.740 0.738 0.772   (Effect on: Y1/Y2): 0.714 0.715 0.758   (Effect on: Y1/Y2): 0.776 0.806 0.841   (Effect on: Y1/Y2):
Y2 0.313 0.309 0.368 1.01 0.88 0.273 0.274 0.344 1.00 0.85 0.376 0.435 0.513 0.90 0.88
C 0.720 0.665 0.686 -0.08 0.03 0.670 0.624 0.659 -0.07 0.06 0.800 0.815 0.854 0.02 0.05
G 0.448 0.511 0.597 0.14 0.17 0.432 0.494 0.585 0.14 0.18 0.474 0.569 0.673 0.20 0.18
TR 0.035 0.034 0.055 -0.03 0.64 0.024 0.024 0.046 0.01 0.89 0.059 0.089 0.143 0.51 0.61
Gamma=0.5
Capital 0.204 0.135 0.174 -0.34 0.29 0.123 0.077 0.117 -0.37 0.52 0.358 0.490 0.653 0.37 0.33
A 0.776 0.864 0.932 0.11 0.08 0.817 0.872 0.938 0.07 0.08 1.012 1.101 1.171 0.09 0.06
U -2.072 -2.243 -2.161 -0.08 0.04 -2.278 -2.457 -2.313 -0.08 0.06 -1.851 -1.734 -1.575 0.06 0.09
Deficit 0.001 -0.014 -0.011 -11.37 0.19 0.773 -0.022 -0.020 -1.03 0.10 0.029 0.048 0.091 0.68 0.88
DWL/Y -0.001 0.012 0.009 12.18 -0.22 0.017 0.021 0.017 0.24 -0.16 -0.020 -0.032 -0.056 -0.58 -0.73
Y 1.273 1.180 1.236 -0.07 0.05 1.161 1.070 1.151 -0.08 0.08 1.414 1.502 1.629 0.06 0.09
Y1 0.816 0.786 0.804   (Effect on: Y1/Y2): 0.786 0.746 0.776   (Effect on: Y1/Y2): 0.859 0.883 0.916   (Effect on: Y1/Y2):
Y2 0.457 0.394 0.432 1.11 0.94 0.394 0.323 0.375 1.16 0.90 0.555 0.619 0.713 0.92 0.90
C 0.877 0.772 0.775 -0.12 0.00 0.793 0.697 0.719 -0.12 0.03 0.985 1.005 1.057 0.02 0.05
G 0.477 0.502 0.557 0.05 0.11 0.450 0.476 0.536 0.06 0.13 0.505 0.574 0.653 0.14 0.14
TR 0.041 0.027 0.035 -0.34 0.29 0.018 0.015 0.023 -0.12 0.52 0.072 0.048 0.148 -0.33 2.07
0.5
Gamma=0.3 0.3
Capital 0.221 0.122 0.073 -0.45 -0.40 0.123 0.040 0.006 -0.67 -0.84 0.540 0.671 0.932 0.24 0.39
A 0.787 0.825 0.874 0.05 0.06 0.792 0.830 0.879 0.05 0.06 1.007 1.067 1.117 0.06 0.05
U -2.058 -2.284 -2.483 -0.11 -0.09 -2.278 -2.696 -3.398 -0.18 -0.26 -1.720 -1.640 -1.518 0.05 0.07
Deficit -0.009 -0.021 -0.027 -1.30 -0.28 -0.019 -0.026 -0.025 -0.36 0.06 0.031 0.045 0.076 0.45 0.70
DWL/Y 0.007 0.018 0.025 1.56 0.40 0.017 0.027 0.034 0.64 0.25 -0.020 -0.028 -0.045 -0.38 -0.59
Y 1.291 1.159 1.059 -0.10 -0.09 1.161 0.960 0.723 -0.17 -0.25 1.531 1.598 1.707 0.04 0.07
Y1 0.845 0.778 0.742   (Effect on: Y1/Y2): 0.811 0.703 0.591   (Effect on: Y1/Y2): 0.891 0.908 0.935   (Effect on: Y1/Y2):
Y2 0.522 0.381 0.317 1.26 1.15 0.446 0.257 0.132 1.51 1.64 0.640 0.690 0.772 0.95 0.92
C 0.885 0.777 0.689 -0.12 -0.11 0.793 0.641 0.469 -0.19 -0.27 1.068 1.086 1.135 0.02 0.04
G 0.475 0.468 0.470 -0.02 0.01 0.450 0.422 0.375 -0.06 -0.11 0.508 0.552 0.604 0.09 0.09
TR 0.032 0.017 0.010 -0.45 -0.40 0.018 0.006 0.001 -0.67 -0.84 0.077 0.096 0.133 0.24 0.39    